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Abstract
The author studies the effects of capital reallocation (the ﬂow of productive capital across ﬁrms
and establishments mainly through changes in ownership) on aggregate labour productivity.
Capital reallocation is an important activity in the United States: on average, its total value is
3–4 per cent of U.S. GDP. Firms with lower productivity are more likely to be reallocated to (i.e.,
bought by) more productive ﬁrms. Reallocated establishments experience an increase in
productivity. The author develops a dynamic model of capital reallocation and compares its
predictions with U.S. data. In the model, limited participation in acquisition markets by
heterogeneous ﬁrms results in an increase in aggregate productivity. With reasonably chosen
parameter values, policy experiments show that the increased reallocation of capital and labour
contributed as much as a 17 per cent improvement in aggregate labour productivity in the mid-
1980s. When a positive total-factor-productivity shock occurs, in steady state the increase in
aggregate productivity arises entirely from this shock, and reallocation is unaffected.
JEL classiﬁcation: E22, L16
Bank classiﬁcation: Productivity; Economic models
Résumé
L’auteur étudie les effets de la réaffectation du capital (ﬂux du capital productif entre les
entreprises et les établissements, surtout à la faveur d’un changement de propriété) sur la
productivité globale du travail. Aux États-Unis, la réaffectation du capital a un rôle important
puisque les montants concernés représentent en moyenne 3 à 4 % du PIB au total. Les ﬁrmes
productives sont plus susceptibles d’acquérir les actifs de sociétés peu performantes, et les
entreprises qui changent de propriétaire voient leur productivité augmenter. L’auteur construit un
modèle dynamique pour quantiﬁer la réaffectation du capital et compare les prédictions obtenues
aux données américaines. Dans ce modèle, l’activité limitée de sociétés hétérogènes sur les
marchés d’acquisition entraîne une hausse de la productivité globale. Des simulations réalisées à
l’aide de valeurs paramétriques plausibles montrent que la réaffectation accrue du capital et de la
main-d’œuvre est à l’origine d’une progression de 17 % de la productivité globale du travail au
milieu des années 1980. Lorsqu’une hausse de la productivité totale des facteurs est observée en
régime permanent, la croissance de la productivité globale s’explique entièrement par ce choc; la
réaffectation du capital n’y est pour rien.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E22, L16
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Productivité1
1. INTRODUCTION
It is well documented in the empirical literature that the reallocation of production inputs across
rms and establishments is an important source of changes in aggregate productivity. As surveyed
in Bartelsman and Doms (2000), there is a large amount of productivity dispersion. This dispersion
is persistent over time, and much of the growth in aggregate productivity is attributable to resource
reallocation.1
A change of ownership and therefore of assets across rms and establishments is an important
component of resource reallocation. Data on publicly traded rms show that, between 1986 and
2004, an average of 4 per cent of rms exited each year from the data, of which 60 per cent were
due to mergers and acquisitions. The share of capital of exited rms is 1.3 per cent of the total
capital in an average year. Capital reallocation through changes in ownership has been increasing
since the 1960s in the United States. In 1999, the total value of reallocation reached a record high:
15.4 per cent of the GDP. The ratio of annual reallocated capital over total capital stock was 8.7
per cent between 1971 and 2004.
How does a change in ownership of capital aect labour productivity and employment in an
economy? This question is important for two reasons. First, studying the impacts of changes in
ownership on productivity and employment helps explain the motives for changes in ownership.
Second, and more importantly, government policies on changes in asset ownership can be evaluated
in terms of productivity and welfare. If capital reallocation increases productivity overall, then
policies that facilitate reallocation are productivity-improving.
This paper studies the eects that changes in ownership have on aggregate productivity in the
United States, and it replicates the stylized facts of reallocation. Two types of reallocation are
studied. One relates to entry and exit, and has been extensively investigated. For example, Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) nd that about 20 per cent of job destruction and 15 per cent of
job creation in manufacturing industries are due to entry and exit. The other type of reallocation is
capital reallocation through changes in ownership. The model in this paper focuses more on capital
reallocation by quantifying its contribution to changes in aggregate productivity.
In the industrial organization and nance literature, many studies analyze the motives of change
in ownership and its relation to the stock market, competition, and rm organization. Only a few
empirical models address the relation between changes in ownership and establishment productiv-
1Studies that use plant-level data from the U.S. manufacturing sector show that about 25 per cent of increase in
productivity during the 1980s resulted from a reallocation of resources from plants with low productivity to those
with high productivity. The output share of establishments (which is related to reallocation) have positive eects on
industry-level productivity. The growth rate of net industry productivity would be negative if there was no share
eect between 1972 and 1977. In fact, at least 20 per cent of the growth in manufacturing productivity in the 1980s
was due to resource reallocation. See Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998) and Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992).2
ity and employment. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) use data on large U.S. manufacturing plants
from the Longitudinal Research Dataset (LRD) to study the eects of changes in ownership on
productivity. About 21 per cent of the plants in their sample changed ownership at least once over
a 10-year period. Lichtenberg and Siegel nd that plants with lower total factor productivity (TFP)
are more likely to be sold. They attribute the low productivity to bad random matches between
plants and their parent rms (owners). Plants that change ownership experience a higher growth
of productivity in the following years. The authors nd that, for transferred plants, the average
productivity residual increases by 23 per cent. In contrast, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) use the
LRD data for the food manufacturing industry and nd that the labour productivity of plants
with changes in ownership is about 20 per cent higher than the industry average at the time of
the transaction, although, for large plants, the acquired plants tend to have lower productivity.
Moreover, plants that experience changes in ownership gain productivity during the 5 to 9 years
following these changes.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) extend these studies by looking into more broad ownership
changes that include partial establishment sales in LRD from 1974 to 1992. They nd that, on
average, 3.89 per cent of establishments change ownership annually. Plants or whole rms that are
transacted experience signicant gains in productivity. The buyers tend to have higher TFP and
tend to be larger than the sellers.2
More recently, using data on changes in asset ownership matched with the Longitudinal Business
Data (LBD) from 1980 to 2005, Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2008) investi-
gate the impact of changes in ownership on employment growth. These authors nd the acquired
establishments experience an average -7 per cent of net employment growth in the year after trans-
action, and -11 per cent of net employment growth in the second year since transaction. The job
destruction rates of these acquired establishments in the rst and second year following transaction
are respectively 18 per cent and 22 per cent, signicantly higher than similar establishments that
did not experience changes in ownership. However, the authors nd that there is little dierence in
the post-transaction growth of the acquired establishments in the manufacturing sector
The above noted empirical papers provide empirical evidence for our model. Their ndings are
based on various microdata samples. But none of them investigates the impact of changes in capital
ownership on aggregate productivity with a general-equilibrium model. The only macroeconomic
models of capital reallocation are Jovanovic and Rousseau (2004) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2004) use technology adoption to explain the waves of mergers in the
United States. When a new technology is invented, rms can adopt it or choose to exit through
2Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2005) use the matched employer-employee data of the Swedish manufacturing
plants, and nd results similar to those obtained with the U.S. data.3
acquisitions. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) study the cyclicality of capital reallocation. Neither paper
quanties the eects of reallocation on productivity.
This paper contributes to the research on reallocation by providing the rst quantitative model of
the contribution made by changes in ownership to aggregate productivity in a stationary economy.
It also provides a framework for evaluating policies dealing with reallocation, such as an antitrust
policy. A change of ownership of capital is modelled as a large investment by the buyers and a large
disinvestment by the sellers. Firms are faced with heterogeneous shocks to their managerial ability.
By managerial ability, we mean how eectively the manager organizes production and chooses
technology. A rm meets its demand for capital by investing either in new capital markets or in
acquisition markets. The optimal investment and capital reallocation is determined by the related
costs and the shocks to managerial ability. The gain in productivity arises from labour saving as
reallocated capital increases. The model is able to match the moments of investment and capital
reallocation for the United States. With reasonably chosen parameter values, we nd that increased
capital reallocation accounts for 17 per cent of the increase in aggregate labour productivity in the
mid-1980s. The model concludes that the economy-wide improvement in aggregate technology in
the late 1990s has had a small impact on capital reallocation, and contributes more to the gain in
productivity in that period by decreasing the demand for labour. Close to 40 per cent of the growth
in aggregate labour productivity can be accounted for by changes in labour choice caused by the
improvement in aggregate technology. Finally, the transition dynamics show that a reduced xed
cost of reallocation induces a large but temporary increase in aggregate labour productivity and a
temporary decrease in aggregate capital in the economy.
Section 2 describes some stylized facts of capital reallocation and species the model. Section
3 denes the stationary equilibrium. Section 4 reports the results of two policy experiments and
the decomposition of gains in productivity. Section 5 provides the results of transition dynamics.
Section 6 oers some conclusions and identies areas for future work.
2. THE MODEL
The model is set up to be consistent with the following stylized facts of changes in capital
ownership. First, establishments with lower productivity are more likely to be transferred than
those with higher productivity. The probability of a change in ownership declines as plant size
increases. Second, buyers tend to be larger and more productive than sellers. Third, establishments
with changes in ownership experience signicant growth in productivity, as found in McGuckin and
Nguyen (1995), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989), Lichtenberg (1992), and Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001), among others. Finally, following the change in ownership, the acquiring rm's existing
business does not show signicant changes in productivity.4
The model economy is composed of one representative household and a continuum of rms. As
stated earlier, rms are faced with heterogeneous shocks to their managerial ability. One homoge-
neous good is produced by rms and used for investment and consumption. The market is perfectly
competitive. In each period, the rm makes decisions on investment in capital, on employment,
and on capital purchased from other rms. The household in each period makes decisions about
consumption, investment, and labour supply.
Capital purchased from the household is called unbundled capital, and capital purchased from
other rms is called bundled capital. Bundling is endogenously determined by the xed reallocation
cost and the relative price of the bundled capital. The xed reallocation cost results in a limited
participation in the bundled capital market. The reallocated capital experiences a gain in produc-
tivity in that it is used for production in combination with the buyer's superior managerial ability.
In addition, less-productive rms experience gains in productivity because they downsize by selling
more capital in the acquisition market.
2.1. Firm
At the rm level, our model shares features with two micro models, taking mergers and acqui-
sitions as a method of investment. Erard and Schaller (2002) estimate a system of two equations
of the Q regression. They nd that both investment and acquisitions are correlated to the buyer's
Q value. In a similar study, motivated by the facts that in nearly 70 per cent of mergers and ac-
quisitions in the United States the buyer's Tobin's Q value is larger than the seller's Tobin's Q
value, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) use the Q theory to explain why some rms buy others. The
authors regress a bundled investment rate on a rm's Q values and nd that the Q value and the
bundled investment rate are signicantly and positively correlated.
We abstract organizational issues by assuming that each rm is operated by a manager who
maximizes the rm's prot.3 We denote managerial ability using ". Using the same amount of
capital and labour, managers with higher " produce more. A rm uses managerial ability, labour,
l, and capital, k, to produce a good. The production function is f(k;l;") = z"(k1 l), where
3In reality, rms own plants. Here, we implicitly assume that all plants owned by the same rm receive the same
management shock, which is rm-specic because all plants of a rm are under the same management. Grith,
Haskel, and Neely (2006) provide some evidence on productivity dispersion within a rm.
Under this assumption, if the rm owns n > 1 plants, and its production function is of the constant elasticity of




 , then the optimal sizes of all plants should be equal to
each other, given that plants pay the same capital price and the same wage rate. It can be shown that the optimal
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. If we use the two-stage optimization,




i into the rm's problem, and then it is straightforward to nd that the optimal n
is undetermined. This indicates that the rm can own many small plants or a few large plants to achieve the same
level of prots.5
 2 (0;1) and  2 (0;1). The decreasing returns to scale imply that the variable prot is positive
in equilibrium, and that rm size is nite and bounded from above and zero.
The aggregate technology level is z, which is constant.4 We use it for comparative statics in later
sections.
With the above rm production technology, we ignore management as an agency problem by
implicitly assuming that the manager maximizes the rm's prot. Agency problems can be serious
in reallocation activities because, in some cases, the selling rm's managers can be oered a large
amount of compensation in order to sell the business under their control.
Assumption 1 The shock to a rm's managerial ability follows an AR(1) process, log"t =
" log"t 1 + t. The innovation term t is identically and independently distributed, with t 
N(0;2
).
The labour market is perfectly competitive. Adjusting labour does not incur any cost, so the













The rm can buy (sell) capital from (to) the output market or the acquisition market. In the
acquisition market, the rm buys capital from another rm. Let xu denote the capital investment
in the output market, and xb denote the capital investment in the acquisition market. Following
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), if the rm buys capital in the output market, the adjustment cost
of capital h1(xu;k) is convex. If the rm buys capital from the acquisition market, it pays pb per
unit of capital. The adjustment cost for capital acquired from the acquisition market is h2(xb;k),
which is also convex. In addition, rms that participate in the acquisition market pay a xed cost,






From a given investment level, the cost of an additional unit of investment in unbundled capital
is larger than the cost of one additional unit of investment in bundled capital. This assumption
4In a forthcoming paper, I extend the current model by allowing aggregate uncertainty, to study the cyclicality of
reallocation and its eects on productivity dynamics.6
implies that, without a xed cost, the rm always buys or sells capital in the acquisition market.
Note that buying and selling the same amount of capital incurs the same level of adjustment cost.
Adjusting employment is nevertheless costless. With these assumptions on the investment costs, if
the demand for investment is small, the rm buys capital only from the output market, because in
doing so the rm does not pay the xed cost. As demand increases, the adjustment cost of investing
in unbundled capital increases faster than the adjustment cost of investment in bundled capital.
After some threshold is reached in the investment level, it is cheaper for the rm to buy a fraction
of capital from the acquisition market. Therefore, we also refer to the acquisition market as the
bundled capital market. The intuition is that assembling new (unbundled) capital, and training
workers to use it, is more costly than if the rm buys bundled capital. However, because of the
xed cost of searching for bundled capital, the rm would rather buy unbundled capital when
its demand for investment is low. As the demand for investment grows, the assembling costs and
training costs are too large for the rm to invest only in unbundled capital; the rm will switch
some investment to bundled capital, because with bundled capital the rm pays less for assembling
capital and training workers. On the other hand, if the rm sells a large amount of capital, it is
more costly to disassemble it for sale in the output market. It is then optimal to sell it in the
bundled capital market.









subject to k0 = (1 )k +xu +xb. The xed cost  = 0 if xb = 0. The gross interest rate (1+r) is
endogenously determined in equilibrium. The exogenous exit probability is d.
Optimal investment
Let the investment rate be i = x=k, and the bundled capital investment rate be ib = xb=k. Given
a total investment level, the rm's choice of splitting between xb and xu is determined by a static
cost minimization. Let ~ i be the investment rate, where the rm is indierent between choosing
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increases, both the left- and right-hand sides increase, but the right-hand side increases less as i
rises, since b < u. When i < ~ i, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side. When i > ~ i,
the left-hand side becomes larger. The threshold investment level ~ i can be obtained by solving
the above equation after obtaining the optimal ib. Because the xed cost is proportional to the
rm's capital stock, the threshold value ~ i is determined only by the cost parameters; hence, it is
independent of the rm's state variables. If the xed cost is , instead of k, then the absolute
value of ~ i is decreasing in k.
Proposition 1 When adjustment costs are quadratic and Assumption 2 holds, it is never optimal
for the rm to choose xu = 0.
In this set-up, the rm is allowed to buy (sell) capital in one market and sell (buy) in the other
market. It can be shown that, when pb<1 b
q
2




u+b, the rm chooses ib < 0 and iu > 0. See Appendix B for details.
Figure 1 illustrates the rm's trade-o between unbundled capital and bundled capital. Each
curve shows the total expenditure of investment per unit of current capital stock (investment plus
adjustment costs per unit of capital stock). To draw this gure, we choose u = 0:758, b = 0:474,
 = 0:059, and pb = 1:10. Figure 2 shows an example of the optimal split between investments in
unbundled and bundled capital.
The capital adjustment cost and xed participation cost are employed to summarize the frictions
in the capital market and the acquisition market. Alternative modelling of frictions could be the
rm's nancial constraint, information asymmetry, and adverse selection in the bundled capital
market. Adverse selection due to asymmetric information seems to be relevant in the acquisition
market. Empirical evidence shows that a signicant portion of capital reallocation fails to improve
productivity. As Kaplan (2000) points out, the extent to which buyers understand the target before
acquisition is an important factor aecting the performance of acquired capital. Acquisition failure
can occur because the buyers do not have sucient information about the target. House and Leahy
(2004) develop an sS model of the used car market where the agent's adjustment costs of purchasing
and selling a car arise from an adverse selection problem. Eisfeldt (2004) considers a model similar
to House and Leahy (2004), but focuses on the interaction between liquidity and adverse selection
in an equity market. We can interpret the xed cost as it arises from the adverse selection problem
or nancial frictions. Our specication of investment costs summarizes all possible frictions, so
that our model is general enough to allow for frictions other than from information and nancial
markets. Meanwhile, we do not need to explicitly model these forms of friction, which can be very8




















































Figure 1: Comparing Costs of Investment







































Figure 2: Optimal split between bundled and unbundled capital
complicated.
Entry
A continuum of potential entrants exists, who decide whether to enter the industry. At the begin-
ning of period t, the entrant makes the start-up investment decision before it draws an idiosyncratic
productivity shock (by hiring a manager) from the distribution 
("). It is assumed that 
(") is
an independent and identical distribution across entrants and over time. The entrant pays a cost9
( k + ce) and decides upon the start-up capital level by solving the following problem5:







(")    k   ce:
The free-entry condition implies that v0(k0)  0. When v0(k0) < 0, there is zero entry. In the
rest of this paper, only the case with positive entry, v0(k0) = 0, is discussed.
The entrants' productivity shocks are drawn from a log-uniform distribution, with the same
support as the invariant distribution of the incumbents' productivity shock. The incumbents' in-
variant distribution of productivity shocks is log-normal. Hence the entrants are, on average, more
productive than the incumbents, but their productivity shocks are more dispersed. In computing
the model, we discretize the AR(1) process of " so that the log-uniform distribution has a bounded
support.
2.2. Firm distribution
Let the rm's policy function be k0 = g(";k) 2 K. The rm distribution over (";k) can be
summarized by the probability measure  dened on S, where S is the  eld generated by the





(1   d)("0;")1fk0=g(";k)gd(";k) + 1fk02KgM
("0);
where ("0;") is the transition matrix of ". The term 1fk02Kg is a vector of zeros, except that where
k = k0 it is one, because all entrants enter with the same amount of capital. On the right-hand
side, the rst term is the conditional distribution of rms that stay in the industry. The second
term is the distribution of entrants on S. Let P("0;k0j";k) = ("0;")1fk0=g(";k)g. It is the transition
matrix of the state (";k). Then, P("0;k0j";k)(";k) =
R
S P("0;k0j";k)d(";k). The evolution of the
rm distribution can be written as
0("0;k0)=(1   d)P("0;k0j";k)(";k) + 1fk02KgM
("0):
If the invariant distribution exists, then we have
(3) (";k) = [I0   (1   d)P] 1  [M1fk02Kg
(")];
5For simplicity, we have assumed that the entrant buys capital from the unbundled capital market. Otherwise, the
relative price of bundled capital, pb, would be present in the costs of entry.10
where I0 is the identity matrix. The timing of this process is as follows: at the beginning of period
t, the rm distribution over (";k) is t. Of this distribution, a proportion, d, of the rms exit
before commencing production. The entrants enter at the beginning of period t with the entry
measure 1fk02KgM. The period t entrants then draw their productivity shock from 
("). Therefore,
the measure of entrants 1fk02KgM
("0) is not part of the distribution t. With the new entrants
and those that exit by shutting down, the industry reaches the end of period t with a new rm
distribution.
2.3. Household




where ct is consumption and Lt is the fraction of individuals employed. This preference is used
in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the household's
optimization is deterministic. The household owns all rms. In each period, the household chooses
the optimal consumption, the labour supply, and investment in rm shares. Let w() be the wage
rate relative to the output price, and let dQ(";k) be the household's portfolio of the one-period
shares of rms with " and k. Also, let (";k;) be the share price of all rms with " and k.
















On the left-hand side of the budget constraint, ("0;k0;) is the price of the rm that enters the
next period with "0 and k0. In a stationary equilibrium, the number of rms with "0 is certain and
given by the invariant distribution of ". In this sense, the household's portfolio dQ(";k) is risk free.
Let the shadow price of the rm's output be p; it is the Lagrange multiplier in the household's
optimization problem. The rst-order conditions are u1(c;L) = p, w =  
u2(c;L)
u1(c;L), and ("0;k0) =

p0
p v("0;k0). The last condition is the standard asset-pricing equation. The price of the rm equals
the discounted rm value. It is discounted because the household buys the shares for the next11
period in the current period.
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Our focus is on the stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit. First, the market clearing
conditions are analyzed. Then, the denition of equilibrium is given.
3.1. Output market
Let the household preference be u(c;L) = logc L. From the household's problem, the aggregate
consumption is C = 1
p. Not surprisingly for the quasi-linear preference, the optimal aggregate
consumption is independent of the non-labour revenue. In addition, the wage rate is w =

p.
In the output market, the net aggregate output that the household can use for consumption in
each period is computed as the weighted output level of all rms. In the stationary equilibrium,
the continuing rm has the following real revenue:
(";k)=z"(k1 l) cf xu(";k) pbxb(";k) h1(xu(";k);k) h2(xb(";k);k):
This is the net output before paying the labour cost, so it equals the total output minus all the
investment costs and the xed production cost. If the rm exits, the sell-o value is zero. The
labour income is cancelled out in the budget constraint condition. The net aggregate output is the
output of all the rms net of investment and related costs by incumbent rms and entrants:






("0)   M( k0 + ce):
The rst term on the right-hand side is the aggregate output of continuing rms, and the last term
is the total cost of entry. Note that, in equilibrium, the aggregate net investment in bundled capital
is zero. The acquisition market aects the consumption only because it is costly to participate in
the acquisition market.
3.2. Acquisition market
Appendix B shows that there exists a threshold value, ~ i, at which the rm is indierent in
choosing xb = 0. Given the price pb, and if the rm participates in the acquisition market, we can
use the rm's optimal split-decision conditions to nd that the rm (";k) buys bundled capital




2(n+a)) and ~ i2 = 1
n(pb 1+
p
2(n+a)). As the price, pb, increases, the rm
tends to buy less or sell more bundled capital.12
The measure of capital being sold is




(pb) is negative and a decreasing function of price pb. The measure of capital being purchased is




which is positive and decreasing in pb. In equilibrium, the two measures sum to zero.
In this model, we assume that the production technology is not embodied in capital. If technology
were embodied in capital, the price of bundled capital would be determined dierently. In that case,
the older the capital, the more outdated the technology, hence the less attractive it is in the market.
Thus, rms with older capital tend to sell more capital in the unbundled capital market than rms
with relatively newer capital. This may drive up the price of bundled capital.6
3.3. Recursive equilibrium





such that the household and rms maximize their expected values, and the markets for reallocation,
assets, labour, and output clear7:
(i) Given prices, v solves the rm's Bellman equation, and l(";k;) and g(";k;) are the rm's




(ii) Given prices, W satises the household's problem. (C;Ls) are the associated policy functions.
(iii) The acquisition market clears: pb solves 	(pb) + (pb) = 0.
(iv) The asset market clears: Q(";k) = (";k) for all (";k) 2 S.
(v) The output market clears: C = Cs().
(vi) The rm distribution is given by Equation (3).
(vii) The free-entry condition is satised; i.e, v0(k0) = 0.
6I thank Jon Willis for pointing this out.
7For the existence of the equilibrium and the invariant distribution (";k), see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989)
and Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992). These authors prove the existence of stationary equilibrium without the aggre-
gate uncertainty. In our case, the proof is left to be done, although the equilibrium seems to exist after the heuristic
check.13
As noted earlier, the household's rst-order necessary conditions are  
u2(c;L)
u1(c;L) = w() and p =
u1(c;L). In equilibrium, we have 1
1+r =
u1(c0;L0)
u1(c;L) or 1 =
p
p0 = (1+r), so the interest rate is 1
  1.
The interpretation of these necessary conditions is standard: the household chooses the optimal
consumption to equalize the market values of marginal utility between two periods. Within the
period, the household's marginal rate of substitution of consumption and leisure equals the wage
rate.
3.4. Model solution
To solve for an equilibrium, note that the price of output satises p() = 1
C and w() = C. From
the equilibrium condition with respect to output, we know that (1+r) =
p
p0. The equilibrium can
be computed by solving the Bellman equation, which combines the rm's dynamic problem and the
household's rst-order conditions. Dene V = pv. After plugging the household's optimal decision
rules and condition (1 + r) = 1 into the rm's problem, the reformulated recursive problem is
obtained as follows:
V (";k;) = max
fxu;xbg
p()[R(";k;) cf  xu pb()xb h1(xu;k)  h2(xb;k)
 k1fxb6=0g]+(1   d)EV ("0;k0;0): (4)
For given prices, each rm with (";k) makes the decisions on labour as shown in Section 2. Let










k with 0 < b < u. The
optimal investment decision is










k; if jij > ~ i;
0; otherwise.
The total investment in the unbundled capital is




In principle, it can be optimal for rms to buy unbundled capital while selling bundled capital
in equilibrium. This is not arbitrage, since the rm that does so is unable to buy an innitely large
amount of new capital and sell it in the acquisition market, because of the cost structure in both
markets. In equilibrium, no rm sells capital in one market and buys capital in the other.
The computation of equilibrium will be based on the following two propositions. The proofs are
shown in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 With the assumptions about production function and utility, the rm value func-14
tion v(";k) is non-decreasing in the output price p.
An increase in p will cause the variable prot R(";k) to increase, because the latter is decreas-
ing in wage w. Meanwhile, consumption decreases as a response to the increase in p. Hence, the
investment in unbundled capital will increase, meaning that rms tend to buy more (or sell less) of
the unbundled capital. From the Euler equation for the unbundled investment, the expected value
function will increase as the investment increases. Therefore, the higher the price, the larger the
value function.
Proposition 3 With the assumptions about production function and utility, in equilibrium, the
rm value function v(";k) is non-decreasing in the entry mass, M.
This proposition is obtained by the equilibrium output condition and the previous proposition.
As M increases, the aggregate net output also increases. For the output market to be clearing, p
must decrease and consumption increase. By the previous proposition, v(";k) also increases.
4. REALLOCATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
This section quanties how exogenous policy shocks in the economy aect reallocation and aggre-
gate productivity measures. First, we describe the baseline computation, and then the steady-state
results. The policy experiments try to link the model to the two recent waves of mergers in the
United States, using the calibrated model to investigate the role of reallocation in changes in ag-
gregate productivity.




(5) yl = (lny   lnl) = lnz + ln" + (1   ) lnk + (   1)lnl:
After plugging the optimal labour choice into this denition, we obtain the rm's labour produc-
tivity as a function of state variables:
yl = lnw   ln   ln:
Then, the change in the aggregate labour productivity between two steady-state equilibria is Yl =
y1
l   y0
l . Another denition of aggregate labour productivity is Y 0
l = lnY   lnL, where Y is the








Because the output-labour ratios at the rm level are equal, this measure of aggregate productivity
Y 0
l reduces to Yl.
Gains in productivity from reallocation are determined by the equilibrium wage rate and the
rm distribution. Any barrier that decreases the wage rate and the rm's total measure necessarily
causes a productivity loss. Firm distribution is important because it also aects the equilibrium
wage rate.
4.1. Productivity decomposition
Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) decompose the aggregate TFP growth into incumbents, en-
trants, and exiting rms. In this model, the rm TFP measure is ", which is assumed to be an
AR(1) process. Its distribution is assumed to be exogenous. But with entry and exit, the equilibrium
distribution of " will change, depending on the level of entry and exit. The entrants are more pro-
ductive, on average, than the incumbents. Thus, following entry, the distribution will change. The
incumbents' productivity shock does not increase, but the share of incumbents changes. Therefore,
all rms contribute to the aggregate TFP growth. The more interesting case is labour productivity,
which can be decomposed similarly.
For convenience, we use the discrete rm distribution. Let i0 be the share of rms with the same
state (";k)i at the steady state 0. The share of rms can be decomposed into entrants, incumbents,


































The aggregate labour productivity change between steady-state 0 and steady-state 1 is
(6) Yl = Y 1























On the right-hand side, the rst term is the contribution of entrants to the change in labour
productivity. The share of entrants potentially changes if the barriers to reallocation change (e.g.,
xed cost). Note that the rm-level labour productivity yi
l does not necessarily change, depending
on whether the shock is to the production technology or to the reallocation cost. The second term
is the contribution of exiting rms, and the last term is the contribution of rms staying in the
industry.16
4.2. Parameters
The household discount factor is  = 0:9615, to reect an annual interest rate of 4 per cent.
The decreasing return to scale is set as  = 0:896. The Cobb-Douglas technology parameter is
 = 0:7143, which implies that the labour share in production is close to 0.64, as in Prescott
(1986). Given this parameter, the capital output ratio is about 2.353. The capital depreciation rate
is  = 0:07, as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). The share of leisure in utility is  = 0:94, so that
around 80 per cent of the population works in the steady state.
The rst-order autocorrelation process of the rm-specic shock is from Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), " = 0:885,  = 0:30, where the AR(1) equation is "t = ""t 1 + t. These values are esti-
mated by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) using the U.S. plant data. Their sample comprises mainly
the large plants, most of which are owned by the publicly held rms. The aggregate technology is
normalized to 1, and it changes in the second policy experiment.
The xed cost, cf, is set as zero. The exit probability is set as d = 0:015, so that the capital
exit rate is 1.5 per cent.8 The entry cost parameter is   = 1:0705, such that the entry rate and exit
rate of capital are equal. The xed entry cost is set as ce = 6:40, with which the rm distribution
has an approximately total measure of 1.
We estimate the parameters u, b, and  with the simulated method of moments where the model
does not have entry and exit. The estimation method is borrowed from Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), but our estimation is based on the general-equilibrium model with prices being endogenous.
The estimation procedure consists of an inner loop and an outer loop. In the inner loop, equilibrium
prices are solved given cost parameters, and the outer loop searches for parameter values to match
moments. The moments we match in estimation are the average annual investment rate, the average
annual reallocation rate, the proportion of rms with positive spikes, the proportion of rms with
inaction, and the proportion of rms that participate in the acquisition market. The data moments
are calculated from Compustat. Appendix A provides more details on the data moments.
The estimated parameter values are u = 0:758, b = 0:474, and  = 0:0585. The estimate of
u is within the reasonable range of estimates in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Hall (2004).
The estimate of b is close to the estimate implied in the Q theory of mergers by Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002), who estimate that the coecient value for Q is 1.916, which implies that the
quadratic adjustment cost in the bundled capital market is 0.52. In contrast, Erard and Schaller
(2002) obtain a very small estimated value of 0.003, but they do not allow for the xed cost.
Table 1 summarizes all parameter values we use for calibration.
8In Compustat, from 1986 to 2004, on average, 4 per cent of rms exited from the data set each year. Of these
rms, close to 60 per cent exited due to mergers and acquisition.17
Table 1: Parameter Values Used for Calibration
     "  u b 
0.96 0.94 0.7143 0.896 0.07 0.885 0.30 0.758 0.474 0.059
d cf   ce
0.015 0.0 1.07 6.40
4.3. Baseline results
The equilibrium price p is obtained from the free-entry condition, and the output market clearing
condition gives the entry mass, M. The acquisition market clearing condition gives the equilibrium
pb. The following algorithm is implemented9:
(i) Fix a value of M.
(ii) Given p and pb, solve the reformulated Bellman equation. Corner solutions for bundled capital
investment are taken care of by allowing rms to choose xb = 0.
(iii) Find the optimal capital at entry.
(iv) Compute the stationary distribution.
(v) Compute the aggregate output and the aggregate bundled capital investment.
(vi) Check the acquisition market clearing. If it is not cleared, change pb and go back to step (ii).
(vii) Check the free-entry condition. If it does not hold, change p and go back to step (ii).
(viii) Check the output market clearing. If it is not cleared, choose a new value of M and go back
to step (vi), until it is cleared.
The computed moments are matched with the U.S. rm-level data. The investment and realloca-
tion moments in the data are computed for the manufacturing industries in Compustat. Appendix A
summarizes the data set and the procedures for computing the data moments. Table 2 summarizes
our baseline results. The investment rate is the ratio of the average of rm-level values of unbundled
capital investment to capital. The reallocation rate is the ratio of the average of rm-level values
of bundled capital investment to capital. The positive spike rate is the average annual proportion
of rms with an unbundled investment of greater than 20 per cent. Inaction is the average annual
proportion of rms with an unbundled investment of less than 1 per cent. The participation rate is
the average annual proportion of rms that have a non-zero bundled capital investment. The model
moments are computed analogous to the data moments.
9An alternative method to compute the equilibrium is by simulation. Given an initial rm distribution, we can
simulate a panel of a large number of rms. In each simulation period, we need to solve for equilibrium prices to
determine each rm's investment decisions. The invariant rm distribution can be obtained when the distributions
from two consecutive periods are very close to each other.18





















Figure 3: Optimal Splits between Bundled and Unbundled Capital
Table 2: Investment and Reallocation
Inv. rate Spike+ Spike  Inaction Cap. sale/Cap. Acqui./Cap. Participation
Data 0.18 0.23 - 0.031 0.014 0.087 0.24
Model 0.16 0.30 0.08 0.027 0.057 0.10 0.20
In equilibrium, no rm buys capital in one market while selling capital in the other market. The
baseline results show that our model can match the long-run data moments well. We also compute
the aggregate productivity measures (Table 3). The output per unit of capital is computed as the
sum of weighted outputs divided by the sum of weighted capital. The output per unit of labour
and the output-to-investment ratio are computed in the same way. But the cost per unit of output
is calculated as the total cost in the economy divided by the total output.
Figure 3 shows optimal splits between two types of capital.
Table 3: Output and Prices in the Model
Output/cap. Output/labour Inv./output Inv. cost/output Price pb Entry mass
Model 0.31 3.35 0.10 0.063 0.438 1.064 0.014
The ratio moments are the averages over rm distribution. It is thus not surprising that labour
productivity is the same for all rms, proportional to the equilibrium wage rate. The ratio of
investment cost to output is the total investment and reallocation costs divided by the total output.
The total cost accounts for 6 per cent of the total output, which is consistent with the estimates
based on plant-level data reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).19
4.4. Fixed cost and reallocation
In the late 1980s, the United States experienced a wave of mergers and acquisitions. The annual
total value of all acquisitions reached 4.84 per cent of GDP in 1988, from 3.11 per cent in 1984,
as documented in Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001). In the mid- and late 1980s, a large proportion
of acquisitions were leveraged buyouts, with investment groups and managers using borrowing to
buy back rm shares. Nearly half of the U.S. corporations received a takeover oer in this period.
After this wave of acquisitions, some rms went private. Meanwhile, from 1985 to 1989, aggregate
labour productivity, aggregate capital productivity, and 4-factor TFP grew by 12.3 per cent, 6.0 per
cent, and 2.0 per cent, respectively. These productivity measures are weighted averages of 4-digit
standard industrial classication (SIC) industries. We use the real shipment-value share of each
industry as their weight.10
During this period, the average investment rate declined and the reallocation rate increased
(Table 4).
Table 4: Investment, Reallocation, and Productivity, 1985-89
Year Inv./cap. Acq./cap. Output/labour Output/cap. TFP
1985 0.21 0.074 213.2 2.56 0.98
1986 0.21 0.146 222.5 2.55 0.97
1987 0.19 0.108 232.7 2.75 1.00
1988 0.18 0.098 238.7 2.78 1.01
1989 0.17 0.097 239.5 2.72 1.00
Note: Investment and reallocation rates are computed from Compustat. These are the unweighted mean over
rm-level values. Productivity measures are computed using the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database. The
productivity measures are the weighted average of 458 4-digit SIC industries.
Source: Author's calculation from Compustat and NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.
The reallocation rate rose from 7.4 per cent in 1985 to an annual average of 12 per cent in
1986-88, representing an increase of 58 per cent. Many rms became private and were delisted from
Compustat in this period; thus, the reallocation rate increase is very likely underestimated.11
Capital reallocation intensied in the late 1980s, mainly because the stock market price was
low relative to the cost of building new capacity. Expanding through takeovers of the capital
of other rms appeared to be less costly than building up new plants. Jensen (1993) takes the
10With equally weighted measures, the growth rates are, respectively, 16.2 per cent, 9.3 per cent, and 3.5 per cent.
11We plot the rm size distributions in 1985 and 1989, and nd that the size distribution in capital shifted to the
left-hand side between 1985 and 1989.20
view that acquisitions in the 1980s were a reaction of capital market participation to corporate
mismanagement of conglomerates. In addition, the antitrust law was less strictly enforced than
before. In 1982 and 1984, the U.S. government introduced merger guidelines that clearly dened
the industry concentration index. It is believed that the clearer denitions of the merger guidelines
induced more mergers.
It seems that xed cost decreases help explain this wave of acquisitions in the United States.
From 1985 to 1989, 4-factor TFP increased by only 2 per cent while output per worker increased
by 12 per cent. The model can generate gains in productivity arising from capital reallocation that
are consistent with the facts during this period. We take the year 1985 as the base year with low
reallocation, and take the period 1986-88 as the years with high reallocation. The aim is to change
the xed costs such that the model can generate a similar magnitude of reallocation increase. The
two steady-state equilibria are compared to study the gains in productivity. In order to examine
the eects of reallocation, we do not change the aggregate technology, but only let the xed cost
decrease from  = 0:068 to  = 0:025.
When the xed reallocation cost decreases, the value of the rm increases. This induces more
rms to entry, since the entry cost does not change. The experiment accommodates this increased
entry by allowing a higher exit rate, so that the new steady-state equilibrium holds. This requires
that the capital cost of entrants change from 1.071 to 1.0735 (Table 5).
Table 5: Eects of Fixed Reallocation Cost
Inv. rate Acqui./cap. Output/cap. Output/labour Inv. cost/output Price pb
 = 0:068;  = 1:071 0.16 0.097 0.315 3.34 0.061 0.44 1.07
 = 0:025;  = 1:073 0.15 0.137 0.304 3.41 0.063 0.43 1.04
Figure 4 shows the distribution change in the two stationary equilibria. As reallocation increases,
the model economy becomes larger.
When the xed cost drops, the reallocation rate rises by 41 per cent and the participation rate
rises from 17 per cent to 37 per cent. The gain in aggregate (or average) labour productivity is
positive but small relative to that in the data. The output per unit of labour increases by 2.1 per
cent and the output per unit of capital drops by 3.5 per cent. Comparing this result with the data,
we see that increased capital reallocation boosts aggregate productivity. The 2.1 per cent increase
accounts for 17 per cent of the aggregate labour productivity increase. Figure 5 shows the changes
in the rm's policy functions. The solid lines are splits in investment of two types of capital when
the xed cost is high, and the dashed lines are the investment splits when the xed cost is low.
When the xed cost drops, the interval of choosing not to participate in the acquisition market
shrinks; hence, investment in the acquisition market increases and investment in unbundled capital21















Figure 4: Cumulative Distributions
decreases. Because capital is less costly, the rms tend to increase the capital size and reduce the
labour demand. Indeed, the rm's average labour demand decreases by 2 per cent. Therefore, the
capital-labour ratio increases. With the decreasing returns to scale in production technology, the
output-capital ratio will decrease and the output-labour ratio will increase if capital is larger and
labour demand is less.





















Figure 5: Changes in Investment as Fixed Cost Drops
The labour productivity in logarithm form can be decomposed into contributions from each
production factor, as in Equation (5). The change in labour productivity is 0.021, of which labour
and capital contribute 0.039 and -0.018, respectively. The change in aggregate labour productivity
in logarithm form can also be decomposed into contributions from entry, exit, and reallocation,22
following Equation(6). We nd that Yl = 0:021.12 The net entry and exit eects cancel each other
out. The gain in productivity is due to capital reallocation across rms. The contribution from the
entry and exit components arises from the higher average productivity shocks of entrants, but this
contribution is very small.
As a consequence of the cost reduction, household aggregate consumption increases by 2.1 per
cent, exactly the same magnitude as the wage increase. This is due to the quasi-linearity of the
utility function, in which the labour supply is perfectly elastic.
4.5. Aggregate technology and reallocation
In the late 1990s, the United States experienced extraordinarily high economic growth, accom-
panied by a wave of investment in information technology. In 1999, the total asset value being
reallocated reached a record high of 15 per cent of the GDP. Unlike the wave of mergers in the
late 1980s, in the 1990s wave, 58 per cent of the transactions were nanced with stocks (Andrade,
Mitchell, and Staord (2001)).
Table 6: Investment, Reallocation, and Productivity, 1995-2000
Year Inv./cap. Acq./cap. Output/hour Output/cap. TFP
1995 0.20 0.10 96.5 100.6 99.2
1996 0.22 0.14 100.0 100.0 100.0
1997 0.21 0.18 103.8 101.4 103.1
1998 0.19 0.25 108.9 101.7 105.7
1999 0.16 0.17 114.0 101.7 108.7
2000 0.21 0.13 118.3 101.0 111.3
Note: productivity measures are from the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). All productivity measures are indexed
with 100 in 1996. TFP is the ve-factor total productivity.
Source: Author's calculation from Compustat and the BLS productivity tables
Table 6 shows that, from 1996 to 2000, TFP increased by 11.3 per cent, capital productivity
increased by 1 per cent, and labour productivity increased by 18.3 per cent.
We are interested in whether the change in aggregate technology causes the reallocation increase,
and by how much the gain in labour productivity is accounted for by the increase in reallocation. As





























shown in section 1, the threshold investment rate at which the rm is indierent between xb = 0 and
xb 6= 0 is independent of the state variables. Since the whole economy is more productive, one would
expect that the wage rate goes up and the output price goes down, and this is true in the model.
However, the demand for investment and labour does not increase in steady states responding to
the increased z. If all rms in the model economy adopt the new aggregate technology at the same
time, the model predicts that the optimal splits between bundled capital and unbundled capital
are unaected and the investment level does not change. Further, the whole economy upsizes, but
the shape of rm distribution does not change, since the labour choice is unaected by the change
in aggregate technology in steady states. The change in aggregate technology aects only the wage
rate, not reallocation, as shown by the rm's optimal labour choice. Hence, the labour productivity
gain is entirely attributed to technology change, not reallocation.
The above observation indicates that, for the change in aggregate technology to induce increased
reallocation, it should be the case that rms respond dierently to the change. For example, only
some rms are able to adopt the new technology, while other rms continue to use the old technology.
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2004) study the role of technology adoption on reallocation, with only
some of the rms being able to adopt the new technology. When the new technology is created,
the rm can adopt it by reorganizing its production internally, or it can choose to exit through
acquisitions.
Let all rms rst have the same aggregate technology z1 = 0:9476. When a new technology,
z2 = 1:0553, emerges, some rms are able to adopt z2, but others cannot. Assume that the transition







In steady state, 75 per cent of rms ultimately adopt the technology z2. The aggregate technology
increases by 8.5 per cent. Thus, two steady-state equilibria are compared: one with all the rms
having technology z1, and the other after some rms have moved from z1 to z2 according to the
transition matrix z.
The results are shown in Table 7. When the economy converges to the new steady state, where
25 per cent of the rms are left to use the old technology, z1, the aggregate investment in new
capital does not change, while the acquisition rate increases by 1 per cent. Consequently, the 8.5
per cent change in aggregate technology causes a 14.6 per cent increase in labour productivity.
Figure 6 shows the change in capital distribution between the two steady states. Clearly, the new
economy has more, large rms.24
Table 7: Eects of a Change in Aggregate Technology
Inv. rate Acqui./cap. Output/cap. Output/labour
z1 only 0.16 0.105 0.3136 3.08
z1 and z2 0.16 0.106 0.3129 3.53
Cost/output Price pb
z1 only 0.063 0.477 1.064
z1 and z2 0.063 0.416 1.064


















Figure 6: Cumulative Distribution of Log(k)
The change in labour productivity is driven by both the change in aggregate technology and the
related investment by rms. We next decompose the change in aggregate labour productivity into
two components: one arising from the change in aggregate technology, and the other arising from
the related changes in capital and employment. Let the joint distribution of rms be z(z;";k).





[logz + log" + (1   )log k + (   1)logl]dz(z;";k):
The aggregate labour productivity in logarithm increases from 1.1247 to 1.2619, an increase of
12.2 per cent. The contribution of labour increases from 1.33 to 1.39. Thus, close to 37 per cent
of the change in productivity is accounted for by changes in employment. The capital component
decreases by 0.002, from -0.153 to -0.155. Thus, the capital component contributes -1.6 per cent to
the increase in aggregate labour productivity.25
Capital reallocation is aected by the change in aggregate technology, but the eect is small,
because the threshold investment rate at which the rm is indierent between unbundled capital
and bundled capital does not depend upon the productivity shocks. Moreover, aggregate technology
aects the labour choice directly without relying on the reallocation of capital. In fact, aggregate
technology is a substitute for labour. Labour productivity rises because labour demand decreases
and aggregate technology improves.
5. TRANSITION DYNAMICS WITHOUT ENTRY/EXIT
To this point, we have focused on the changes in productivity in steady states. This section
examines the transition dynamics when the xed cost is dropped permanently.
The transition dynamics are computed without entry and exit because it is not clear whether the
entry and exit rate of capital should be equal during the transition. To simplify the computation,
the entry and exit are shut down. The transition between steady states is computed to examine the
short-run eects of a reduction in xed costs and a change in aggregate technology. The parameter
change is permanent and unanticipated by the rms. The transitional paths are shown in Appendix
C.
When the xed reallocation cost drops, two eects are created on the capital markets. First, it is
relatively less costly for rms to enter the acquisition market. More rms participate in the acqui-
sition market and invest less in the unbundled market. On the other hand, total investment is less
costly. As a result, the prices decrease and the investment in unbundled capital decreases. The net
eect on capital markets is that the reduced xed cost temporarily reduces the demand for capital,
and therefore the aggregate capital decreases temporarily. When the price goes down, the wage rate
increases, so rms should hire less labour. But, in fact, the aggregate labour increases temporarily
before it goes down. This indicates that various rms respond dierently. Those rms that increase
their capital (for example, rms that previously sold o capital) have a higher probability mass.
Because the capital of these rms increases, they hire more labour.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Given the fact that some rms are more productive than others and some managers have better
managerial ability than others, it would be most ecient to have all capital and labour organized for
production in the most productive rms. In reality, both the production technology (returns to scale)
and reallocation frictions prevent capital and labour from owing from the less productive rms to
the more productive rms. These frictions are not only informational and technical, but they can
also be related to policy and institutions. The model in this paper is a step toward quantifying the
benets of reducing these frictions. Our analysis demonstrates that removing reallocation frictions26
boosts the productivity of aggregate labour. As much as 20 per cent of the growth in productivity
can be accounted for by increased reallocation. The implication is that government policy should
facilitate the reallocation of capital and labour. The results of this paper also raise the issue of
whether the enforcement of antitrust policies should take into consideration the gains in productivity
that result from mergers.
Our model assumes the existence of persistent productivity shocks and a perfectly competitive
labour market. In equilibrium, all rms have the same labour productivity, which equals the equi-
librium wage rate. However, empirical evidence shows that labour productivity at the rm and
plant levels is not equal among establishments. This begs an extension to the current model to
explain the dispersion of labour productivity across rms, and to investigate the contribution of
worker reallocation to growth of productivity. This can be done by either assuming that rms have
dierent abilities to use the same workers, or introducing heterogeneous workers who have a dif-
ferent productivity or quality. At the aggregate level, a gain in productivity arises either from the
increased share of rms using workers more eciently or from increased worker quality.
Further detailed study of the transition dynamics is needed to understand how the capital market
and the labour market react to reallocation frictions.
Finally, the agency problems related to the incentives of managers and to information asymmetry
in the acquisition market could be modelled explicitly. In particular, the importance of informational
friction should be quantied.27
APPENDIX A: DATA
The U.S. data on manufacturing are from Compustat. We choose periods between 1971 and 2004
for computing moments because the reallocation variable in Compustat is available only during that
period. Adding the mineral industries and construction industries only changes moment values very
slightly. All dollar values are deated using CPI (with 100 in 1996). Firms with capital value less
than 0.5 million dollars are removed. Capital is the level at the beginning of a year (data item
7). Investment is the expenditures on plant, property, and equipment (data item 128). Capital
sale is the dollar value of sold plant, property, and equipment (data item 107). Acquisition is the
total expense of acquiring the plant, property, and equipment from other rms (data item 129).
Employment is the total number of employees (data item 29).
Moments for Manufacturing Industries
Table A.1 gives the investment and reallocation moments. In this table, micro moments are
computed as the averages of rm-level values. Investment rate is the average of rm investment
rates. Spike is the proportion of rm-year observations with an investment rate larger than 20 per
cent. Inaction is the proportion of rm/year observations with an investment rate less than 1 per
cent. Participation is the proportion of rm-year observations that have non-zero acquired capital
value.
Table A.1: Investment and Reallocation Moments
Inv. rate Spike Inaction Cap. sale/cap. Acqui./cap. Participation
Micro 0.181 0.23 0.031 0.014 0.087 0.24
Macro 0.114 0.23 0.031 0.012 0.075 0.24
Macro moments are computed as the averages of annual moments. Investment rate is calculated
as the average annual investment rate, which is the yearly total investment of all rms divided by
the yearly total capital stock of all rms.
Figure A.2 and Figure A.3 show the changes in the distribution of rm size, measured with
capital and employment. The moments of these distributions are given in Table A.2.
Table A.2: Firm Size Distribution
Mean Std dev Skewness Kurtosis
Capital 1.88 (0.356) 2.22 (0.160) 0.49 (0.068) 2.80 (0.110)
Employment 2.74 (0.292) 1.92 (0.180) 0.25 (0.053) 2.72 (0.123)28




























Figure A.2: The U.S. Firm Distribution in Capital
Capital is the logarithm of demeaned data item 7. First we divide the rm's capital by the
yearly industry average capital, and then we take the logarithm. Employment is computed in the
same way. All moments are calculated as the averages of yearly values during 1971-2004. Values in
brackets are standard deviations of moments.





























Figure A.3: The U.S. Firm Distribution in Employment
Moments for Mineral, Construction, and Manufacturing
The moments in Table A.3 are computed by choosing all rms in the mineral, construction, and
manufacturing industries. Moments of rm size distribution in these industries are given in Table
A.4.29
Table A.3: Moments: Investment and Reallocation Rates
Inv. rate Spike Inaction Cap.sale/cap. Acqui./cap. Participation
Micro 0.180 0.25 0.036 0.016 0.088 0.22
Macro 0.116 0.25 0.036 0.012 0.078 0.22
Table A.4: Firm Size Distribution
Mean Std dev Skewness Kurtosis
Capital 1.95 (0.336) 2.21 (0.160) 0.45 (0.066) 2.75 (0.137)
Employment 2.64 (0.325) 2.04 (0.221) 0.052 (0.130) 2.90 (0.192)
A.1. Productivity
We use the NBER-CES industry data to compute productivity moments for the years between
1971 and 1996. The data are on the 4-digit SIC industry level. The aggregate productivity measures
are mean productivity measures weighted by share of industry shipment in total shipment. The
standard deviation of productivity measures is also weighted by shipment values.
The productivity measures between 1997 and 2001 are computed from the BLS productivity
website at <http://www.bls.gov/>.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
B.1. When does the rm choose xb = 0?
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ui + 1   pb):
B.2. When is xb = 0 optimal?















Let ~ i be the total investment rate at which the rm is indierent between xb = 0 and (xu 6=30
0;xb 6= 0), then ~ i = 1
u(pb 1
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the rm chooses xb = 0, investing in unbundled capital only. Next, we check the conditions under
which the rm does not choose xu = 0 over xb = 0. We compare the costs of choosing xu = 0 and
xb = 0.
If the rm chooses xb = 0, then we have pbi+
b
2 i2+ > i+
u















the rm would choose xb = 0 over xu = 0.
Therefore, when the investment rate is in the intersection of the above two sets (B-2) and (B-3),
the rm will choose xb = 0, investing in unbundled capital only. From inequality (B-4) (below),
we know that the cost of xu = 0 is always larger than the cost of xu 6= 0;xb 6= 0. Therefore, the
condition (B-3) is redundant.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 1















First, we need to nd the range of investment rate at which the rm chooses xu = 0 over
investing in both types of capital. The dierence between the two cost functions of xu = 0 and















(bi 1+pb)2  0; (B-4)
where in the second line Equation (B-1) is used. This positive dierence of investment costs between
the two cases implies that, for any investment rate, the rm never chooses xu = 0 over (xu 6= 0;xb 6=
0).
Next, from the above algebra we know that the rm will choose xu = 0 over xb = 0 if investment
rate i is located in the complement of (B-3). This implies that the rm must also choose (xu 6=
0;xb 6= 0) over xb = 0, because the set (B-3) is larger than set (B-2). But inequality (B-4) implies
that the rm always chooses (xu 6= 0;xb 6= 0) over xu = 0.31
Therefore, the rm will never choose xu = 0.
The above proof is also valid if the xed cost is , instead k. However, these two forms of xed
cost induce dierent cut-o values, ~ i, at which the rm is indierent between xb = 0 and not.
B.4. When does the rm choose to buy capital in one market and sell it in another market?
From the above, we know that the optimal ib = 1
u+b(ui+1 pb). Therefore, if ib > 0, then
i >
 1+pb
u . If iu < 0, then i <
1 pb
b . The two inequalities hold together only if pb < 1. Meanwhile,
the investment rate must be located in the complement of (B-2). It can be shown that it is possible
that ib > 0 and iu < 0 only when i > 1
u(pb 1+
p
2(u+b)). For i to not be located in an empty










In a similar way, we can show that, if pb >1+b
q
2
u+b, the rm chooses ib < 0 and iu > 0. At




B.5. Proof of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3
Proposition 2. With the assumptions about production function and utility, the rm value
function v(";k) is non-decreasing in the output price p.
First, note that
@R(";k;)
@w < 0, hence
@R(";k;)
@p > 0. The derivative of the value function with



































The terms in square brackets are Euler equations, respectively, for two types of investment, and
they are zero for the optimal investment. If the rm does not participate in the acquisition market,
the last term is zero. Therefore, the value function is non-decreasing in p.
Proposition 3. With the assumptions about production function and utility, in equilibrium, the
rm value function v(";k) is non-decreasing in the entry mass, M.
This proposition trivially follows the previous proposition and the market clearing condition for
the output.
APPENDIX C: TRANSITION DYNAMICS
The transition path is computed as follows, starting with the stationary equilibrium for  = 0:065.
Assume that the steady states are in period 0 and T +1. The unanticipated shock occurs in period
1.32
(i) Fix T. Compute the initial steady-state equilibrium f;p;p
bg and the nal steady-state
equilibrium f;p;p
b g.
(ii) Guess a sequence of prices fpb;tgT
t=1 and fptgT
t=1.
(iii) Use backward induction to obtain the policy functions for each period fg("t;kt;pt;bb;tgT
t=1.
(iv) Given the period 0 rm distribution, use the policy function to obtain the series of rm
distribution ftgT
t=1.
(v) In each period, check the output clearing condition and the acquisition market clearing con-
dition. If the excess demands are positive, increase the prices; if negative, decrease the prices.
Go back to step (ii).
(vi) Stop when the output clearing condition and the acquisition market clearing condition are
satised.
We set T = 25. Increasing T does not improve the results.33











































Figure C.1: Transition Path from  = 0:065 to  = 0:03034
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